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I. INTRODUCTION
Under contemporary international law, the use of force in inter-
state relations is prohibited except in the case of self-defense.
Thus, a state which uses force against another state violates a
pre-existent legal obligation, namely, that of refraining from the
use of force, and can be exonerated from this violation only if it is
able to demonstrate that it acted in self-defense in a case justify-
ing such action within the limits imposed by law. It is important to
note that prior to the period between World Wars I and II, and
more definitely prior to the outlawing of the use of force in the
Charter of the United Nations, the concept of self-defense related
more to the law of armed conflict than to the law of state respon-
sibility. Consequently, while the concept of self-defense in the con-
text of armed conflict was thoroughly explored, the precise rela-
tionship between self-defense and state responsibility was never
closely examined. In the new world legal order, self-defense has
become merely a defense against responsibility for the violation of
the obligation to refrain from use of force; therefore, its role as an
exculpatory factor calls for a more precise definition.
This article will attempt to analyze matters which, in the
available literature, often have been dealt with only narratively or
casuistically, with little concern for systematization and no special
refer( nce to state responsibility. The two main purposes of the ar-
ticle are first, to define more precisely the situation which can
lawfully give rise to self-defense, and second, to trace the contours
of what constitutes a proper response in self-defense. In so doing,
the exculpatory effect of self-defense will be explained, as well as
the degree to which that effect may be restricted because of the
non-observance of the limitations on self-defense. It is hoped that
this approach will afford a better grasp of the workings of the con-
cept of self-defense in the area of state responsibility.
*Of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. Former Member of the
Board, National Bar Association, Cairo; former Justice of the Supreme Court, Algiers.
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II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
A. Historical Perspective
Because traditional international law did not set any limits on
the use of force by states, it contained no rule holding a state
responsible for the use of force against another state. War repara-
tions exacted by victorious powers from their vanquished enemies
were contractual in nature, founded on the conventional provi-
sions of the relevant peace treaties and not on any general rules of
international law. Only gradually did the principle of responsibility
for the use of force become accepted in international law. The
seed was sown when the first Convention with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 1899) recognized
that, between the contracting parties, "the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."' The Regula-
tions annexed to the Convention prohibited certain forms of the
use of force but did not explicitly provide any sanction for the
disregard of this prohibition. However, the second Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague,
1907), provided in Article 3, that "a belligerent party which
violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation."' The principle of respon-
sibility for the use of certain forms of force was thus acknowledged,
albeit hesitantly, as suggested by the qualifying phrase "if the
case demands." It was expected that the first major conflict which
occurred after the ratification of the second Convention of The
Hague would give rise to the implementation of the responsibility
provided for in Article 3. Such was not the case, however, in World
War I, even though all of the belligerents were parties to the Con-
vention. The relevant provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (ar-
ticles 231 and 232) read in part: "[t]he Allied and Associated
Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of
Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to
which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon
them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."3 These are
conventional war reparations in the traditional sense, exacted by
one party and agreed to by another outside the purview of any
I TEXT OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE, 1899 AND 1907, 59 (Scott ed. 1908). The
reference is to Article 22 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, annexed to the Convention.
2 Id. at 206.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND AFTER 413, 425 (1947)
(emphasis added).
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pre-existing general rule of international law. The responsibility
of Germany for all losses and damages is a further indication that
those reparations were not based on the rule contained in Article
3 of the second Convention of The Hague, since the rule provides
for the payment of compensation only for the violation of a pro-
hibition on certain forms of the use of force, not for all the conse-
quences of the use of force.' The Covenant of the League of Na-
tions (1919) and the General Pact for the Renunciation of War
(1928) did not significantly affect the status of responsibility for
the use of force.' This explains why the use of force was not dealt
with by writers of the period under the heading of state respon-
sibility. Literature on the topic consisted mostly of discussions
relating to the treatment of aliens. In general, it was confined to
instances of responsibility in peacetime and rarely, if ever, ex-
tended to responsibility arising out of armed conflict.
It is therefore not surprising that international lawyers in pre-
Charter years could not agree whether the concept of self-defense
had a place in international law. No one doubted the permissibility
or legality of the use of force in the name of self-defense. But some
argued that there was no need for an exception permitting the use
of force on grounds of self-defense when there were no limits
perscribed by international law on the use of force. There was
unanimity, therefore, on the permissibility and the legality of
resort to force by a state claiming that it was acting in self-
defense, but disagreement over whether the legality of such use
of force by the state was the rule or a special case calling for a
particular justification. Whatever theoretical merit this discussion
may have had, it could not be of much help in defining the concept
of self-defense in contemporary law, since it related to a legal
order where there were no constraints on the use of force as an in-
strument of the national policies of states.6 The discussion con-
See note 1 supra.
Article 12 and the following articles of the Covenant of the League subjected the use of
force to prior formalities intended to promote a peaceful settlement of the dispute without,
however, outlawing the eventual use of force per se. If a state resorted to force without
observing those provisions, its responsibility would have been for failure to comply with
procedural prerequisites and not for the use of force as such. Force still appeared to be the
ultimate arbiter of inter-state disputes.
' Representatives of the view that there was no place in the international law of the
period for the category "self-defense" are: D. ANZILOTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
506 (1929), Giraud, La Thiorie de la 1dgitime Dfense, [1934] III ACADEMIC DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL, RECUEIL DES CouRs 715, and Ago, Le D4lit Internationa [1939111 ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 537-539. Representatives of the opposite view
are: I. SPIROPOULOS, TRAITE THEORIGUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 287
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taned, however, the seeds of the subsequent development of in-
ternational law. As Ago pointed out:
One cannot, therefore, speak of self-defense in international law
except in the context of a particular international law which con-
sensually precludes-or at least restricts-the right of self-
protection. According to Kelsen, the proper and specific institu-
tion of self-defense is not conceivable except under a particular
international law where the application of coercive measures
would be centralized the way it is within the State. But he con-
cedes that an analogous legal form could possibly emerge where
there is only a mere consensual limitation of the privilege of
responding to injuries inflicted. In such instances self-defense
could in fact operate in the following manner: a State which has
renounced in general the use of force as a means of protecting
its rights would not, nevertheless, be committing any tortious
act in resorting to the use of force for the purpose of repelling
an actual and illegal aggression.'
Precisely such a development as foreseen by Kelsen and Ago took
place when the nations of the world adopted or later acceded to
the Charter of the United Nations, renouncing the use of force in
their relations8 and providing for self-defense only in the case of
armed attack.9 In view of the centrality of the Organization in the
international order (Articles 2.6 and 103) and its present virtual
universality of membership, the law of the Charter reflects the
current state of general international law rather than the particu-
lar stance of a convention. ' ° It can therefore be maintained that it
(1933), BASDEVANT, Re'gles du Droit de la Paix. [1936] IV ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURs 540, and DE BUSTAMENTE Y SIRVEN, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 526-552 (1936).
Ago, supra note 6, at 539.
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 2.4.
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 51.
ID On this last point, see P. JESSUp, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 168 (1948), Tunkin, Co-
Existence and General International Law, [1958] III ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 65, A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 217 (1961), Reuter, Principles
de Droit International Public, [1961] III ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES
COURs 622, I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 120, 280
(1963), Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, Corrective Security, Law of War and
Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 767 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968), P.
LAMBERTI ZANARDI, LA LEGGITMA DIFESA NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 301-306 (1972), and
Zourek, La Notion de Ldgitime Ddfense en Droit International, [1975] ANNUAIRE DE L'IN-
STITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 55. See also the legal memorandum entitled "The Legality
of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam" submitted by the U.S. Department of
State to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1966, where the following
statement is to be found in footnote 3:
[W]hile nonmembers . . . have not formally undertaken the obligations of the
United Nations Charter as their own treaty obligations, it should be recognized
[Vol. 10:1
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was with the Charter that self-defense acquired the status of an
autonomous concept of international law having a specific legal
content and, more specifically, that it became one of the circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness in state responsibility.
The term "self-defense" was in wide use in the nineteenth and the
early twentieth centuries, at a time when there were no legal con-
straints on the use of force by states, because of the general onus
of aggression even in a world order which did not prohibit the use
of force. Self-defense was being freely invoked in a variety of
situations in justification of many state actions, not on specific
legal grounds but on political or moral grounds. The vagueness of
the concept at the time and its lack of any real legal content are
exemplified by such statements as: "[une nation qui veut faire la
guerre est toujours en 4tat de I4gitime ddfense," made by
Cl~menceau, and a statement attributed to James Williams11: "[als
for a war of aggression, we will never wage it except in self-
defense." 2
Despite the lack of a necessary link between self-defense, as it
was then conceived, and the prior use of force against the state in-
voking it, self-defense has commonly appeared in the context of
the use of force since the days of the League. In state practice,
both before and after the Second World War, resort to force in
self-defense has been associated almost without exception with
the idea of reaction against the use of force. After decades of be-
ing invoked loosely by governments and diplomats in justification
of various state actions which were nothing but manifestations of
forcible self-help, the term "self-defense" acquired a more
restricted and obvious meaning not far removed from its meaning
in municipal law. For at least forty years it has appeared in state
practice principally as a reaction to the use of force against the
territorial domain or the physical entity of a State. 3 Article 51 of
the Charter obviously supports this restricted concept of self-
that much of the substantive law of the Charter has become part of the general
law of nations through a very wide acceptance by nations the world over. This is
particularly true of the charter provisions bearing on the use of force ... Thus it
seems entirely appropriate to appraise the actions of [a non-Member State] in
relation to the legal standards set forth in the United Nations Charter. 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 565, 569 (1966).
1796-1869, U.S. diplomat and later Confederate representative and propagandist in
Europe.
2 Both cited by Zourek, supra note 6, at 3.
'a See J. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 252, 255; D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (2d
ed. 1970).
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defense since it relates self defense to the occurrence of an "armed
attack." It is unlikely that a state can now meaningfully invoke
self-defense in any other context, particularly in connection with
its failure to honour any international legal obligation requiring a
particular positive action on its part or any obligation requiring it
to abstain from a particular action other than the use of force (see
subsection C below).
The pre-1945 attitude toward self-defense was so entrenched
that it carried over to the post-Charter period. As an example, the
work of the United Nations International Law Commission on
state responsibility was restricted, in its first phase ending in
1961, to the study of questions relating to responsibility of the
state for injuries caused in its territory to the person or property
of aliens. In 1963, however, the Commission adopted a new ap-
proach to the subject, marking a break with the traditional treat-
ment of state responsibility. While not neglecting the experience
and material gathered in certain special sectors, particularly that
of responsibility for injuries to the person or property of aliens,
the commission agreed that priority should be given to the defini-
tion of the rules governing the international responsibility of
states, with special emphasis on the possible changes caused by
new developments in international law. Thus, non-use of force as a
possible source of responsibility and self-defense as a possible ex-
onerating cause became integral parts of the newly redefined field
of state responsibility. It was indeed under the Charter of the
United Nations that states became bound for the first time by a
general unqualified obligation to refrain from the threat and use
of force. Having assumed such an obligation in international law
states would, in principle, face responsibility for any breach of
that obligation. This was reaffirmed in the Declaration on Prin-
ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (resolution 2625 (XXV))4 and in Article 5.2 of the
Definition of Aggression (resolution 3314 (XXIX)),5 with specific
reference to "responsibility under international law" and to
"international responsibility.""6 The principle having thus been
established, a state wishing to avoid responsibility for the use of
force would have to prove that it did not take the initiative in the
" G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 128, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970).
" G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
" Id. See also Fairley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law:
Reopening Pandora's Box, 10 GA. J. INT'L AND COmP. L. 29 (1980).
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use of force but used it only in reaction to a prior use of force by
the other state. It is in this sense that self-defense is now a cir-
cumstance precluding wrongfulness in state responsibility.
B. Self-defense in municipal law
There are pitfalls resulting from the indiscriminate transplant-
ing of concepts of municipal law into international law. There are,
however, principles and general concepts which are common to
both legal orders. Even writers who refuse to recognize any inter-
action between municipal law and international law admit that
certain general legal principles such as self-defense are to be
found in both municipal law and international law, although they
stress that the content of these principles need not be the same."
The rationale for self-defense is in fact the same in municipal law
and in international law. Therefore, the normative regulation of
the institution is quite similar in both systems. A review of self-
defense in municipal law thus can shed some light on the cor-
responding concept in international law.
Self-defense is invoked in municipal law by the author of an act
otherwise entailing responsibility, in order to exonerate himself
from that responsibility. A more precise description of the effect
of a successful plea of self-defense would be that it removes the
wrongful character of the respondent's act so that no responsibility
can ensue from it. The act per se committed by the respondent is
invariably an objective breach of a pre-existing general obligation
to abstain from acts causing death or injury to a person or (in certain
countries) destruction or damage to property. However, because
the act was committed under circumstances of self-defense it does
not retain its delictual nature and the perpetrator is relieved from
responsibility.
The above characteristics of self-defense in municipal law are
common to many countries. For example, in the United States,
self-defense, if successfully invoked, "exonerates its beneficiary
from criminal responsibility for acts arising out of the defense,
provided these acts are properly performed within the scope of
the defense."'" Consequently, "a person is relieved from criminal
responsibility when, during the exercise of this lawful right in a
reasonable manner, he or she causes harm to others or damage to
,1 V. Koretsky, General Principles of Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957), reviewed by
O.J. Lyssitzyn, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 202 (1959).
11 M. BASSIOUNI. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 462-63 (1978).
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property."'9 In French law, the Penal Code itself makes it quite
clear that where there is self-defense there is no wrongful act.
The opening words of Article 328 of the French Penal Code read:
"I1 n'y a ni crime ni dW1it .... "'I
It may therefore be said that in municipal law, the plea of self-
defense has the following two characteristics: 1) it follows a positive
act committed by the respondent; and 2) the said act is a violation of
an obligation to abstain from doing something. Self-defense is in-
tended to ward off an actual and immediate danger to person or to
property. It has an essentially defensive or preventive purpose. It is
always a reaction and not an initial action. The rationale behind the
exonerating effect of self-defense is that an injury to another person
inflicted solely for the purpose of averting an equal or greater injury
to oneself does not retain its original tortious character and thereby
becomes lawful. Because of its particular nature, self-defense can
never be invoked in justification of failure to perform a positive obli-
gation to do something whether it is an obligation or diligence or an
obligation to achieve a certain result. Self-defense pertains pri-
marily to the field of criminal responsibility. A plea of self-defense
can be relevant to civil responsibility in connection with a claim for
damages based on murder, assault or destruction of property. In
such cases, the findings of the criminal court are binding on the civil
court.
C. Self-defense and other exculpatory circumstances
Self-defense is only one of several defenses available to
preclude state responsibility. It is neither the most important nor
the one most likely to be invoked. The restricted applicability of
self-defense as a bar to responsibility is due to the fact that it is
relevant only to the violation of one specific obligation, that of
refraining from the use of force. The excuse of self-defense cannot
be invoked in any other context. In Kelsen's words, there can be
self-defense only "against a specific violation of the law, against
the illegal use of force, not against other violations of the law."'"
Responsibility in interstate relations may result from the non-
performance or violation of any obligation binding on the state
19 Id.
o See PETITS CODES DALLOZ, CODE PENAL 180 (76th ed. 1978-79).
2 Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the
United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1948),
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regardless of its nature, its content, or its source. Especially im-
portant are obligations requiring the state to carry out a certain
action or to abstain from a certain action other than the use of
force, whether the source of such obligations lies in a treaty, in
some other instrument, or in customary international law. Respon-
sibility resulting from the non-performance or violation of these
obligations cannot be avoided by a plea of self-defense. Other ex-
culpatory circumstances that could apply include force majeure,
fortuitous event, state of necessity or consent of the injured state.
These common causes of exoneration from state responsibility
merit a short explanation.
Force majeure is an unpredictable and irresistible event exter-
nal to the state invoking it and generally not attributable to
human agency, which prevents the state from performing a pre-
existent obligation. Fortuitous event is a similar concept which is
often used interchangeably with force majeure. Irresistibility is
the main characteristic of force majeure while unpredictability is
the dominant ingredient in fortuitous event. The latter is an event
which, had it been foreseen, could have been averted. This distinc-
tion, it should be noted, carries no legal consequences as far as ex-
oneration from responsibility is concerned. Necessity is a defense
arising wherever a state, by reason of circumstances beyond its
control, is compelled to act or to abstain from action in violation of
a pre-existing legal obligation to which it is bound. Necessity dif-
fers from both force majeure and fortuitous event in that the
unlawful conduct of the state results from a voluntary decision
taken as the only way to protect a threatened vital interest con-
sidered higher than the violated obligation; the other two are
reactious to external forces which operate independently of the
will of the state. Finally, consent of the injured state is approval
by it of a/hi act or an omission by another state which, in the
absence of such approval, would have been a violation of a pre-
existent obligation. In such a case, the other state's responsibility
cannot be asserted: volenti non fit injuria.
Force majeure, fortuitous event, necessity and consent of the
injured state can be invoked to preclude state responsibility for
failure to perform any type of binding legal obligation, regardless
of its nature or source. Self-defense can be so invoked only in con-
nection with a single general obligation of negative content, namely
non-use of force. Self-defense can only be invoked to rebut a
responsibility arising in conditions of armed conflict whereas the
other circumstances precluding wrongfulness apply to all in-
1980]
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stances of responsibility arising in the course of peaceful relations
between states. Thus, with respect to most international obliga-
tions a plea of self-defense is of no relevance. There is only a par-
tial overlap between the concept of self-defense and the scope of
state responsibility; the former is much narrower than the latter.
As a result, self-defense is of limited usefulness as a cause of ex-
oneration from state responsibility and in practice is likely to be
of lesser incidence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness
than other circumstances of wider application.
III. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
As discussed earlier in this Article, the absolute prohibition of
the use of force is currently an exclusive provision of general in-
ternational law, binding on the whole community of nations, not a
consensual provision in a particular international law co-existing
with a different norm of general international law. The absolute
and definitive break with the past did not immediately win univer-
sal acceptance. Accordingly, different opinions concerning what
the scope of self-defense should be under the Charter were ex-
pressed.
Soon after the adoption of the Charter, two views developed
concerning the extent to which Article 51 was meant to restrict
the right of self-defense. One view maintained that "the provisions
of Article 51 do not necessarily exclude the right of self-defence
in situations not covered by this Article."22 The reasoning behind
this position was that States "have those rights which general in-
ternational law accords to them except and insofar as they have
surrendered them under the Charter."2 The assumption,
therefore, was that although Article 51 confirmed the right of self-
defense in one particular situation, that of an armed attack, it did
not thereby deny the said right in other situations where it had
been recognized in customary international law. According to this
view, Article 51 did not lay down new norms and was only decla-
ratory of the pre-existing customary law in one instance of self-
defense without affecting the rules of customary law permitting
self-defense in other instances.24 Members of the International
22 L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS. 301 (2nd ed. 1949).
2 D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 185 (1958).
" For an exhaustive listing of authors supportive of this view, see P. LAMBERTI ZANARDI,
supra note 10, at 204 n.47; and see the author's discussion of the topic at 204-224. See also
ZOUREK. L'INTERDICTION DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 98, n.134 (1974).
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Law Commission of the United Nations embraced the opposite
view as early as 1949, stating in no uncertain terms that under the
Charter self-defense was permitted only against armed attack and
that no residual right of self-defense under customary law was to
be preserved.25 It should be added, however, that some members
of the commission did, in fact, favor the continued existence of a
right of self-defense which had a wide scope and was based on
customary law. 6 The restrictive view based on a strict construc-
tion of Article 51 has gained wide doctrinal support." One writer
has summed up the argument by explaining that "the permission
in Article 51 is exceptional in the context of the Charter and ex-
clusive of any customary right of self-defense."" Others have
claimed that those who hold the view that a customary right of
self-defense exists outside the purview of Article 51 "assume that
the customary law became static by 1920 or earlier, and ignore the
possibility that the customary right may have received some more
precise delimitation in the period between 1920 and 1945."' Thus
it may be said that the Charter, rather than modifying the
customary right of self-defense, "simply expresses a change which
that right had already undergone" by the time the Charter was
adopted.30
It is an axiom of legal interpretation that where a general pro-
hibitive norm is established, any permissive exceptions to it must
be provided for explicitly. By no process of reasoning can there
validly be any further encroachment on the general prohibition.
Those who indulge in such an exercise are creating new rules
under the guise of interpreting the existing law. This is par-
ticularly objectionable when the premises of such reasoning are
derived from a pre-existent situation from which the newly
enacted general prohibitive norm was intended to mark a signifi-
cant and definitive break. What the proponents of a "liberal" in-
terpretation of Article 51 are wittingly or unwittingly justifying is
,1 [1949-I] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 108, para. 68, 69, 146-47, para. 63. 64 (United Nations
1956); [1951-I] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 115, para. 141 (United Nations 1957); [1951-1I] Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 37, para. 35, 36 (United Nations 1957).
ZS [1951-I] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 115, para. 142 (United Nations 1957).
7 E. JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS 401
(1958); P. VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHT 554 (5th ed. 1964); Zourek, supra note 10, at 46, 52-53;
R. TAOKA, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1978). For a more com-
plete listing of references in support of the strict interpretation of Article 51, see P.
LAMBERTI ZANARDI. supra note 10, at 205-206; ZOUREK, supra note 24, at 104, n.160.
2 I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 273.
, Id. at 274-275, 279-280. See also R. TAOKA, supra note 27, at 86.
30 Skubiszewski, supra note 10, at 766.
1980]
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
the carrying-over into the legal order of the United Nations," of
practices the strict legality of which may not have been con-
tested under a previous, fundamentally different, legal order. In
so doing they are disregarding the decisive importance of the pro-
hibition on the use of force in Article 2.4, which opened a new
chapter in state relations and ushered a new legal order basically
different from the one it was intended to replace. 2 The admittedly
less than perfect functioning of the new order in some cases is no
justification for continued adherence to aspects of the old order
which impede the implementation of the rule of non-use of force.
The application of the "liberal" approach would reverse the evolu-
tion of international law rather than aid in translating the norms
of the new legal order into realities of international relations.
That the viewpoint is still championed is attributable either to the
continued influence of the old concepts and the stubbornness of
established mental habits or to partisan support for national
policy positions which lag behind the development of international
law reflected in the Charter.
A second canon of construction is that a provision containing an
exception from a basic rule must be interpreted restrictively. It is
obvious that Article 51 contains an exception, expressed in un-
equivocal language, from the basic rule of non-use of force set
forth in Article 2.4. It is impossible, unless one disregards the
above canon of construction and the letter and the spirit of Articles
2.4 and 51, to maintain that there are instances other than an arm-
ed attack where resort to force in alleged self-defense would be
permissible under the Charter. The meaning of the term "armed
attack" is quite clear. It was deliberately used to reduce the
discretion of states to determine for themselves the scope of per-
missible self-defense and to uphold to the utmost the basic rule of
non-use of force. It is therefore submitted that any interpretation
of Article 51 which would justify recourse to force where the ac-
tion which triggers the response is not an armed attack is a legal-
ly incorrect interpretation.
The permissive interpretation of Article 51 becomes even less
persuasive when considered in light of the recent discussion on
the issue of jus cogens among international scholars. Though the
issue has not been fully resolved, writers on the subject have been
virtually unanimous in their acceptance of the concept of an inter-
8' See text at note 10 supra.
32 Zourek, supra note 24, at 103.
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national jus cogens,33 i.e., peremptory norms which bind subjects
of international law absolutely and from which derogation is not
possible. Though writers disagree on the precise definition of jus
cogens,a4 they do agree generally that the principle of prohibition
of the use of force is a prime example of it.3" Thus, the principle of
non-use of force in Article 2.4 and the self-defense exception in
case of armed attack in Article 51 are widely considered peremp-
tory norms of international law. The Vienna Convention on the
law of Treaties" defines this as a norm "accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character."37 A permissive interpretation of Article 51,
allowing states to fashion exceptions to the general prohibition of
Article 2.4 by unilateral action or even by agreements inter
partes, would run counter to a fundamental tenet of international
jus cogens, which states that "[a] treaty contravening a jus cogens
rule would be void ab initio .... ""
The general question of whether there are instances, other than
those explicitly mentioned in the Charter, where the use of force
could be lawful and the more specific question of whether in-
stances of self-defense other than the one covered by Article 51
exist have been raised in the debates of the various United Na-
tions bodies. Representatives of a small number of governments
have in the past expressed positions supporting an affirmative
reply to the two above-mentioned questions, but it is significant
that since 1965 such statements of position have not been
repeated. The example of the United Kingdom is particularly in-
structive. Before the Security Council in 1956, the representative
"' Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law, in CONFERENCE ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1967). For a
thorough survey of leading international scholars who have written on this issue, see id. at
26-48. See also Tunkin, International Law in the International System, [1975] IV ACADEMIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 85-94 and Whiteman, Jus Cogens in Inter-
national Law, 7 GA. J. INT'L AND COMp. L. 609 (1977).
"' Two schools of thought have developed on the issue of the definition of jus cogens
rules. The first defines jus cogens by its object. The second defines it by its legal effects.
See Abi-Saab, Introduction, in CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE CONCEPT OF Jus
COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (1967).
" Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT. L. 55
(1966). See Suy, supra note 33, at 49.
36 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969).
3 Id. at Article 53.
M Abi-Saab, supra note 34, at 11. See also Schwartzenberger, International Jus Cogens?,
43 TEXAS L. REV. 455 (1965).
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of the United Kingdom argued that the co-ordinated Franco-
British military operations in Egypt did not violate Article 2.4
because they were not directed against the sovereignty or the ter-
ritorial integrity of Egypt and because their purpose was not in-
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations." During the
eighteenth and twentieth sessions of the General Assembly, state-
ments by representatives of the United Kingdom in the Sixth
Committee indicated in no uncertain terms their view that Article
51 did not cover the whole content of the right of self-defense
under customary law.40 However, this position was abandoned at
subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. More significantly,
in its contributions to the work of the Special Committee on Prin-
ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in 19661 and in 196742 and to the work of
the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression in
1969, 43 the United Kingdom concurred with the position that in-
stances of lawful use of force were limited to action by or under
the authority of a competent organ of the United Nations (or of a
regional organization) and to individual or collective self-defense.
Although the proposals did not explicitly cite Article 51, their
silence on the extent of the right of self-defense is significant in
view of the previously declared position of the United Kingdom
and of the virtual consensus rejecting that position.
IV. THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE
A state facing a claim in responsibility for the use of force can
successfully invoke self-defense as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness only if it can show that thq following two elements
exist: (a) a prior armed attack by the claimant state; and (b) an im-
" 11 U.N. SCOR, (735th Meeting) 15, para. 89 (1956); 11 U.N. SCOR, (749th Meeting) 4,
para. 7, 23-24, para. 139 (1956); 11 U.N. SCOR, (751st Meeting) 10-11, para. 61 (1956). In pro-
nouncements made at home the British Government justified the military operations
against Egypt, inter alia, by the argument that self-defense comprehends the protection of
nationals. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, 255, 265, 297 and the references cited by the author.
The most recent advocacy of this position is to be found in J. LLOYD, SUEZ 1956, at 238
(1979).
0 18 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (805th Mtg) 124, para. 7 (1963); 20 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (881st Mtg) 240,
para. 15 (1965). Compare the statement by the representative of the same member state
before the Security Council in 1951. 6 U.N. SCOR, (550th Mtg) 20 (1951). The political
motivation of the two positions, taken in different sets of circumstances, can hardly be
contested.
A/AC.125/L.22, para. 3.
'2 A/AC.125/L.44, Part I, para. 3.
A/AC.134/L.17, para. 3.
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mediate proper response by the respondent state. In Section A,
the definition of armed attack and the requirement of priority in
time will be discussed. Section B will examine the nature of ac-
tions likely to be taken in self-defense, the requirement of im-
mediacy, the requirement of effectiveness, and the requirement of
proportionality.
A. Prior Armed Attack
1. Definition
Perhaps because the meaning of the term was considered to be
self-evident, the legislative history of Article 51 does not provide
an explanation for what exactly constitutes an armed attack. The
presence of the concept of self-defense in the Charter and its rela-
tion to the basic rule of non-use of force indicate, however, that
armed attack must involve a minimum of illegal" use of physical
force by the armed forces of the state. The scale of the use of
physical force appears to be immaterial. Thus all the following in-
stances should be considered covered by the term "armed attack":
(a) an all-out invasion of the territory of the respondent state;
(b) lesser military operations across frontiers;
(c) incidents where isolated units of the armed forces of the
claimant state use physical force against units of the re-
spondent state on land, at sea or in the air; and
(d) incidents where individual agents of the state, e.g.,
solitary frontier guards, are subjected to physical force by
similar elements or by larger units of the claimant state.
It is in the last mentioned situation that self-defense in inter-
national law would most resemble the corresponding concept in
municipal law.
An interpretation of the term "armed attack" which would be
restricted to grave breaches of the peace, even if the difficulty of
defining such breaches is disregarded, appears to be inconsistent
with the essence and purpose of self-defense. Under the require-
ment of proportionality, a particular level of an armed attack,
must be met by a like force. 5 In order to fully understand what
type of use of force may be termed armed attack and what type
" Although under the Charter use of force is, as a general rule, illegal by definition, the
illegal character of the attack is mentioned here in order to rule out: a) military action taken
by or under the authority of a competent organ of the United Nations, against which there
can be no self-defense and b) use of force in self-defense, which does not justify further ac-
tion by the initial attacker in alleged self-defense, thus creating a vicious circle.
, See subsection B infra.
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may never be so termed, institutionalized coercion must be
distinguished from physical force. States normally use various
forms of organized force to carry out their functions and to en-
force their laws. Legislative, judicial or administrative measures
taken by organs of the state and enforced by its coercive
machinery may in some cases affect important interests of
another state. Such forcible measures, however, do not qualify as
use of force likely to constitute an armed attack. An armed at-
tack must necessarily involve illegal use of physical force by the
armed forces of the state against targets not within the state's
jurisdiction. This point deserves attention because in the past
coercive measures taken by one state in the exercise of its
jurisdiction often gave rise to the use of force by another state in
alleged self-defense. Past failures to make the distinction between
institutionalized coercion and the use of physical force led, at least
in one instance, to extensive debates on whether a case for the
proper exercise of self-defense could be made."
According to one doctrinal opinion,47 armed attack, within the
meaning of Article 51, is not synonymous to armed aggression. It
is explained that armed aggression is more broad in scope than
armed attack and that only the most violent and massive forms of
armed aggression qualify as armed attack and justify the use of
force in self-defense under Article 51. In the light of the requirement
of proportionality, 8 the value of this distinction between armed
4" The Franco-British military intervention in Egypt, which followed upon the na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956, was denounced by the majority of Member
States as being in violation of Article 2.4 and unjustifiable under Article 51. First Emergency
Special Session, 10 U.N. GAOR, (502nd Mtg) 15, 37 (1956). Cf. Wright, Intervention 1956, 51
AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 274 (1957) "Great as the hazards to British welfare may have been in the
nationalization of the Canal, those hazards were more distant and speculative than those
which international law deems a justification for military acts of self-defense." It should be
noted that the British military operation could not qualify as self-defense not merely
because the hazards to Great Britain were "distant and speculative" but primarily because
the measure taken by the Egyptian Government, namely the nationalization of the Com-
pany, could not at all be considered as use of force likely to constitute armed attack. The
British response also failed to meet the requirement of immediacy.
" P. LAMBERTI ZANARDI, supra note 10, at 224-230. At an earlier date (1967), a similar
view had been expressed, without much elaboration, by "The Lawyers' Committee on
American Policy Toward Viet-Nam," in a legal memorandum on the Viet-Nam war, where it
was stated that there is armed attack only "if military forces cross an international boun-
dary in visible, massive and sustained form." See CRIMES OF WAR 195 (Falk ed. 1971).
Besides the lack of any emphasis on the idea, it must be recalled that the concern of the
authors of that document was the war in Viet-Nam, and their purpose was to refute the of-
ficial U.S. position, not to give an exhaustive definition of what constitutes armed attack
within the meaning of Article 51.
"' See subsection B infra
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attack and armed aggression in the context of self-defense is ques-
tionable. The view under consideration is based on the necessary
premise that self-defense can only assume the form of an all-out
counter-attack, and that only a prior attack of equal scope and in-
tensity can justify it. This premise is faulty since in each instance
of self-defense only force which is reasonably called for to repel
the actual peril can be lawfully used. If an isolated unit of the armed
forces of state A, on land, at sea or in the air, comes under attack
by elements of the armed forces of state B, there is no doubt that
the former may lawfully take action against the latter in self-
defense. Rejecting the argument of self-defense in such an in-
stance on the ground that the action of the forces of state B,
although an armed aggression, did not amount to an armed attack
appears to be unsupported by both the letter and the spirit of Ar-
ticle 51. In the context of state responsibility, claims of reparation
for death or property destruction in minor incidents involving
small units of the armed forces (or even individual agents of the
state) may be in practice more frequent than claims based on an
all-out armed attack. There appears to be no valid ground for rul-
ing out self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in
such cases on the basis of the questionable distinction between
armed aggression and armed attack and a corresponding artificially
narrow interpretation of Article 51.
One author ascribing to the armed aggression-armed attack
dichotomy cites border incidents and isolated military actions as
examples of armed aggression which fall short of armed attack
and would not, in his view, give rise to the right of self-defense.49
There can be no disagreement that border incidents or isolated
military actions cannot justify all-out war in alleged self-defense.
Such a r action would obviously fail to meet the requirement of
proportibnality. This, however, does not mean that the state
which falls victim to such relatively minor armed attacks should
not be permitted to use proportionate force to ward off the im-
mediate peril or that if it does so it should be precluded from in-
voking self-defense in order to avoid responsibility for the conse-
quences of the incident. With regard to state responsibility in par-
ticular, the distinction between armed attack and armed aggres-
sion, and the legal consequences which would follow if there are
restrictions made on the scope of self-defense as a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness would appear to be unacceptable. The
findings of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel
11 P. LAMBERTI ZANARDI, supra note 10.
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(Merits) Case"0 strongly indicate that the concept of self-defense
applies also to situations which do not constitute an all-out armed
attack likely to endanger the territory or the political in-
dependence of a state."
In the course of the debates which preceded the adoption by the
General Assembly of the resolution on the definition of aggres-
sion, some representatives pointed out that the definition should
distinguish clearly between aggression and the legitimate use of
force.52 It was observed that the Charter expressly provided in
Article 51 for the exercise of the right of self-defense in the event
of armed attack. Other representatives maintained that the
Special Committee's terms of reference did not entitle it to em-
bark on a definition of the right of self-defense and that any at-
tempt to do so would simply place an insurmountable obstacle in
its way. 4 There was also disagreement on whether to mention the
requirement of proportionality, or the limits of self-defense.55 As it
emerges, the resolution did not deal with these questions and
referred to self-defense only indirectly in Article 6 of the defini-
tion which reads: "[n]othing in this definition shall be construed as
in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, in-
cluding its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is
lawful."56 Thus, the resolution leaves unaffected the meaning of
the term "armed attack" in Article 51.
Nothing in the resolution can be taken as an indication that
each one of the acts of aggression listed in its Article 3 constitutes
armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. It is clear,
however, that the acts mentioned under (a), (b) and (d) of Article 3
(namely, invasion or attack and occupation or annexation, bom-
bardment or other use of weapons and attacks by the armed
forces of a state on those of another) constitute obvious cases of
"armed attack" because all involve the illegal use of physical force
by the armed forces of one state against another. Blockade, men-
SO Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. REP. 4.
" Id at 31. Although the Albanian shore battery did not fire on the United Kingdom
warships, the incident had the potential for such an attack. The finding of the Court regard-
ing the preparations aboard the United Kingdom ships necessarily leads to the conclusion
that, had there been firing from the shore, the United Kingdom would have been justified
in responding in kind to an attack which would have obviously fallen short of an all-out
armed attack.
'2 See U.N. GAOR, (29th Sess.), Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9619 & Corr. 1 (1974).
U.N.Y.B. 772 (1969).
U.N.Y.B. 600 (1971).
U.N.Y.B. 836 (1968); U.N.Y.B. 653 (1972).
G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9615 (1974), reprinted in 69
A.J.I.L. 480 (1975).
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tioned under (c), also should raise no special difficulties if it is en-
forced by the use of force against the vessels of the coastal state,
although the requirements of effectiveness and of proportionality
would probably lead to the conclusion that only such action which
was required to lift the blockade would be justified in self-defense.
The position of the three remaining acts of aggression listed in
Article 3 with regard to self-defense is not clear. It is difficult to
determine whether, if the situation mentioned in paragraph (e)57 is
not accompanied by military action involving actual use of
weapons by the forces of occupation, it would be possible to main-
tain that violation of treaty provisions by change of purpose or by
extended presence constitutes in itself armed attack justifying
the use of force by the territorial state in self-defense. Also,
where a state which allows its territory to be used by another state
for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state, as pro-
vided in paragrah (M1, and does not itself use physical force, the
question arises as to whether the latter is justified in using force
against the former in self-defense. A negative answer to these two
questions appears to be more in line with the generally accepted
meaning of armed attack in Article 51. The third act of aggression
for which the characterization as armed attack would probably be
wrong is mentioned in paragraph (g) of Article 3 of the definition,
which deals with the sending of armed bands to carry out acts of
armed force against another state "of such gravity as to amount to
the acts listed above" or substantial involvement therein. This is
the often discussed question of so-called "indirect aggression."5 In
recent state practice, collective self-defense was invoked in the
following instances to justify military intervention in the territory
of the state which was the target of armed bands of "volunteers" or
insurgents aided and abetted by another state, and not in
justification of the use of force directly against the latter: Greece,
1944-1946; 5' Korea, 1951;O Hungary, 1956; ' Lebanon and Jordan,
11 Id. Para. (e) reads as follows: "[tihe use of armed forces of one State which are within
the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State in contravention of
the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such ter-
ritory beyond the termination of the agreement."
I See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 325-327, 369-373; P. LAMBERTI ZANARDI, supra note
10, at 248-261.
" During the debate in the Security Council on 30 January 1946, the United Kingdom
representative cited as a decisive argument the fact that it was the Greek Government that
had requested his Government to keep its troops in Greece. He added: "Surely an Allied
country.., is entitled to have troops in a country if invited by that country's Government."
1 U.N. SCOR (1st Meeting) 81, 83, 86, 88, 89 (1946).
" G.A. Res. 498, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A) 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add. 1 (1957).
WI The representative of the USSR, speaking in the Security Council on 2 November
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1958.2 The state's right to use force in self-defense against the ac-
tual combatants, whatever they may be called, is beyond any
doubt a matter of internal jurisdiction, as is its right to seek and
receive help in this regard from other friendly states. The real
test to determine whether activities of armed bands or irregulars
sent by another state constitute armed attack in interstate rela-
tions would come in connection with the use of force against the
state accused of sending or supporting those attackers. Recent
state practice does not provide any guidance in this respect.
While sending or assisting armed bands, irregulars or
mercenaries is without question an illegal interference in the in-
ternal affairs of the target state and now has been officially
characterized as an act of aggression if of sufficient gravity, 3 it re-
mains to be determined whether such actions constitute armed at-
tack on the part of the accused State and whether such action
justifies the use of force against that state under Article 51. The
absence of any use of force by the armed forces of the last-
mentioned state and the restrictions imposed on the right of self-
defense by the double requirement of effectiveness and propor-
tionality would indicate that the target state should not use force
in alleged self-defense directly against the state accused by it of
sending or supporting the bands of irregulars. The reverse conclu-
sion would raise the risk of major breaches of the peace resulting
from supposedly defensive action based on mere allegations or
vague evidence of foreign complicity in civil strife or in actions of
limited importance by infiltrators said to have been sent by
another state.
1956, stated that the dispatch of Soviet troops to Hungary was at the request of the
Hungarian People's Government, with a view to assisting the Hungarian People's Army
and the Hungarian authorities to restore order in Budapest. 11 U.N. SCOR (752nd Meeting)
24 (1956).
" During the debate in the Security Council on 17 July 1958, the representative of the
United Kingdom stated: "In these circumstances, what could be more natural than the ap-
peal of His Majesty King Hussein and the Government of Jordan for assistance from friendly
Governments in maintaining their country's independence? My Government was one of
those to whom this appeal was made and we have responded to it." 13 U.N. SCOR (831st
Meeting) (1958). At a previous meeting of the Security Council, the representative of the
United States stated that "the President of Lebanon has asked, with the unanimous
authorization of the Lebanese Government, for the help of friendly Governments so as to
preserve Lebanon's integrity and independence. The United States has responded positively
and affirmatively to this request in the light of the need for immediate action." 13 U.N.
SCOR (827th Meeting) 6 (1958).
"3 See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 56.
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2. Priority in time
In self-defense an on-going physical act of aggression perpe-
trated against a potential victim is countered by a similar act on
the victim's part designed to prevent the perpetrator's act from
achieving its injurious end. Parallelism in kind and sequence in
time are essential to the concept of self-defense. It is only because
the potential victim's act follows upon the perpetrator's act that
the former is purged of its delictual content, although both acts
are intrinsically of the same nature. If the sequence in time be-
tween the two acts is disregarded, the line of demarcation be-
tween aggression and self-defense would be blurred beyond
recognition. It would become conceptually impossible to
distinguish one act from the other and there would ensue an in-
conclusive dispute in which the best arguments invoked would be
subjective judgments on how insidious the other party's inner-
most intentions could have been. The wording of Article 51 fully
supports the adoption of these classic elements of self-defense.
Since the use of force in self-defense is lawful only "if an armed at-
tack occurs," it follows that the start of an armed attack must
precede the exercise of the right of self-defense. This is what is
meant by the requirement of priority in time. The state subjected
to an armed attack need not wait until the attack has fully
developed. The very first use of physical force would justify ac-
tion in self-defense. It may even be said that the sooner the action
in self-defense is taken the more likely it is to be successful in
preventing the attack from achieving its unlawful ends.
Those who held that Article 51 did not cover all instances of
self-defense in customary law, and others who favoured a wider
acceptance of the term "armed attack" maintained that prepara-
tions for an imminent attack constituted such an immediate threat
as to justify anticipatory action in self-defense. 4 One argument ad-
duced in support of this position was that since not only the actual
" For reference to those authors and to others who hold that there can be no an-
ticipatory self-defense see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 275-276; P. LAMBERTI ZANARDI,
supra note 10, at 231-232, n.110. See also R. TAOKA. supra note 24, at 116-119 where the
author justifies anticipatory self-defense by a state "if military movements of armed forces
of another State have already begun with the object of inflicting damage upon the former"
but not if the state merely "believes another harbours intention to make an armed attack
against it in the near future." It is to be noted that a determination by state A that the
military movements of the armed forces of state B have begun with the object of inflicting
damage upon it necessarily involves a subjective judgement not much different from the
assessment of the mere intention of state B and carries the same hazards to international
peace which the prohibition of anticipatory self-defense is meant to obviate.
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use of force but also the threat of force was outlawed in Article
2.4, the permission in Article 51 should be interpreted as including
the threat of an imminent armed attack. This view not only
disregards the particular nature of self-defense mentioned in the
preceding paragraph but also contravenes the canons of inter-
pretation referred to in Section III above. Since Article 51 con-
tains an exception of strict construction to the general prohibition
of Article 2.4, no valid case can be made for extending the provi-
sion of Article 51 to all the instances mentioned in Article 2.4. The
latter may proscribe both the threat and the use of force while the
former may allow the use of force in one instance only; that of an
actual armed attack, as unequivocally provided in the text. A legal
justification of anticipatory self-defense must therefore be con-
sidered lacking in contemporary international law.
Some meta-juridical arguments based on pseudo-strategic con-
siderations have been advanced in support of the permissibility of
anticipatory self-defense. It has been maintained that from a
military standpoint, an imminent armed attack can best be
countered by a pre-emptive counter-attack. It has been also
argued that ruling out the possibility of anticipatory self-defense
would ensure for the aggressor the advantage of the first strike
and would make his military posture better than that of the victim
of his aggression. In reply to such arguments it may be said that
modern air power and long-range guided missiles, kept in
readiness with the help of electronic reconnaissance, permit such
quick and effective responses to an initial attack that the
attacker's lead would appear insignificant. As for the military ad-
vantage supposedly afforded the attacker, this argument appears
to relate to an age when the use of force between states was
unfettered and when there was no machinery to control and to
sanction the use of force. In the current world legal order, a com-
plaint to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter
should be sufficient to deter any armed attack under preparation
through: (a) exposure of the potential aggressor's supposedly
secret preparations for an armed attack; (b) the censure of inter-
national public opinion; and (c) any measures eventually decided
upon and enforced by the Security Council. In this era of the
United Nations, no state should be permitted to take the law into
its own hands by attacking first another state suspected by it of
harbouring hostile intentions and of making real or imaginary
preparations for an armed attack. Such preparations can be met
only with defensive preparations on the other side and with refer-
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ral of the threat to the peace to the Security Council for ap-
propriate action under the Charter. 5 When it comes to the con-
frontation between nuclear powers, which represents the most
serious threat to the peace of the world, second-strike capability
has been effective, and will conceivably continue to be so, in deter-
ring a first nuclear strike. In this context, in particular, the in-
calcuable risks involved in the erroneous notion of anticipatory
self-defense boggle the imagination.
B. Immediate Proper Response
1. What constitutes self-defense
The parallelism in kind between armed attack and the action
taken against it in self-defense, discussed above, leads to the con-
clusion that only the use of physical force by the armed forces of
a state is justifiable in terms of self-defense. Actions of a dif-
ferent kind taken by the state cannot be explained as having been
taken in self-defense. Such other actions may or may not be
capable of justification under other rules of international law, but
self-defense cannot be successfully invoked. Being an exception to
the illegality of the use of force, self-defense can only justify the
use of force by the respondent state against the claimant state
and serves to rebut a claim by the latter state for compensation or
other redress based on state responsibility for the use of force by
the former.
Some coercive measures taken by the state in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, even when enforced manu militari and even if their
legality is open to question, do not qualify as use of force within
the meaning here intended. Such measures as the visit, search and
seizure of neutral ships or their cargo, incarceration of aliens or
seizure of their property by way of nationalization etc., must
therefore stand on their own merits; a plea of self-defense in
respect to them is of no relevance. Obviously, since these
measures do not qualify as use of force in self-defense, they also
do not qualify as use of force, even less as armed attack, justifying
self-defense in reaction to them. In fact, one cannot properly talk
of self-defense where there has been no use of physical force
either in the initial action by the claimant state or in the reaction
to it by the respondent state. Therefore, coercive measures of this
" See Zourek, supra note 24, at 106-107, with reference to the Cuban missile crisis of
1962.
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nature cannot be adequately dealt with either supportively or
critically, in terms of the proper rules of self-defense.
An example of the confusion engendered by discussing coercive
governmental measures under the rules of self-defense is provided
by the Security Council debate of July-September 1951 on the
restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through the
Suez Canal. During the consideration of the item, the represen-
tative of Egypt invoked Article 51 in justification of the visit and
search of neutral ships crossing the Canal and the seizure of
Israeli or Israel-bound goods found on board. Other represen-
tatives maintained that, under the terms of Article 51, exercise of
the right of self-defense was restricted to cases of armed attack
and that under the existing circumstances, Egypt's actions did not
meet the conditions set forth in Article 51.6 During the debate it
was implicitly assumed that the actions in question could, under
different circumstances, constitute acts of self-defense. In
paragraph 8 of its decision adopted on 1 September 1951, the
Council found that the practice followed by Egypt "cannot in the
prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is
necessary for self-defense." 7 The qualifying phrase "in the
prevailing circumstances" implies that under different cir-
cumstances measures under the consideration of the Council such
as visit, search and seizure could be justified on grounds of self-
defense. No action other than the use of force by the armed forces
of the state comes under the strict legal definition of acts liable to
be carried out in self-defense. Any other actions undertaken by
the state, and in particular coercive measures, even though for-
cibly implemented, can stand or fall on grounds based on the proper
rules applicable to them and should not be examined in the light of
the rules of self-defense. This point must be borne in mind when
grappling with the legal concept of self-defense in an effort to
define it as precisely as possible, in order to extract it from the
vagueness and confusion which prevailed in the past and which
appear to be still lingering in the minds of some. The value of the
decision of the Security Council as a legal precedent would have
UNITED NATIONS, REPERTORY OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 432 (1951).
' Id Another example of such legally incorrect characterization is to be found in the
statement by the representative of Syria in the Security Council to the effect that closing
down the pipelines and cutting off the oil supply to Western European and American
markets was an act carried out "in legitimate exercise of [the] right of self-defense." 22 U.N.
SCOR, (1350th Meeting) 16, 17 (1967). It is also to be noted that the said action was not
directed against the state responsible for the armed attack (Israel), but against other states
suspected of supporting the attack.
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been enhanced had the Council stopped at the finding, in
paragraph 7, that the practice in question was "an abuse of the ex-
ercise of the right of visit, search, and seizure." The problem, in
effect, is one of characterization. Actions by the State other than
the use of force by its armed forces cannot be correctly charac-
terized as acts of self-defense.
2. The three requirements of immediacy, effectiveness and
proportionality traced to a common source
When exercised in self-defense, the purpose of the use of force is
to frustrate an attack and to prevent it from attaining its intended
injurious goals, thus protecting the victim of an attack from the
harmful prior action initiated by the attacker. This is one case of
the end justifying the means. In view of the overriding impor-
tance of the end served by self-defense, the whole normative
structure of the institution must be subordinated to it so as not to
extend the bounds of legitimate self-defense beyond the strict
limits dictated by that all-important end to which the institution
owes its existence in the first place. This teleology of the use of
forces in self-defense imposes on such use of force a threefold
limitation:
(a) Force must not be used before an armed attack starts (hence
the requirement of priority) or after the attack has been
consummated (hence the requirement of immediacy).
(b) The means of force employed must be such as to be likely
to repulse the attack by inflicting on the attacker only such
injury as is necessary to achieve that end (hence the re-
quirement of effectivness).
(c) Only such force as is necessary to repulse the attack may
be used (hence the requirement of proportionality).
Any use oi force which does not meet this three-part teleological
test does not qualify as self-defense and either fails to preclude
wrongfulness altogether or has a limited exonerating effect in
state responsibility.
3. The requirement of immediacy
Since the one and only lawful purpose of self-defense is to
repulse an armed attack in progress, action in self-defense must
immediately follow upon the start of an attack. In practice there
1980]
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
may be some time-lag between the start of an attack and action
taken in self-defense, but in all cases self-defense must be under-
taken while the attack is still in progress. Once the attack is con-
summated and active military operations by the attacker have
ceased, there can be no proper exercise of the right of self-defense
since the possibility of preventing the attack from realizing its
aims no longer exists. Action against the attacker after the attack
has been consummated would not serve the purpose of repulsing
the attack. It may be intended to avenge the attack or to restore
the situation which prevailed before the attack. Clearly the aim of
avenging an attack is not covered by the legal concept of self-
defense, which serves only to avert an actual peril. The limits of
self-defense do not permit the state exercising it to get even with
the attacker, to teach him a lesson, or even to prevent a repetition
of the attack. There is more justification for the aim of removing
the effects of an attack and restoring the pre-existing situation,
but, strictly speaking, this also does not appear to be covered by
the legal concept of self-defense. Such action is in reality a forcible
affirmation of the rights of the state, an autonomous concept of in-
ternational law having its proper rules, and should therefore not
be judged under the rules of self-defense.
4. The requirement of effectiveness
Only such forceful means as are likely to frustrate the
attacker's aims by repulsing the attack may be used in self-
defense. This is because the purpose of self-defense is not to inflict
injury for its own sake but to prevent the realization of the objec-
tives of the actual attack in progress. The target of self-defense
should be the attack as such and not the state responsible for the
attack. Thus, the aerial bombardment of population centers far
removed from the scene of operations and without particular im-
portance for the attacker's war effort would not meet the require-
ment of effectiveness. If a naval blockade involves the use of force
against the vessels of the coastal state, only naval and aerial
operations intended to lift the blockade would undoubtedly meet
the requirement of effectiveness; a counter-attack across land
frontiers would probably fail to meet it. If a state is subjected to
an attack by land across one frontier, a counter-attack across
another frontier of the attacking state would not be effective in
repulsing the actual initial attack. The requirement of effec-
tiveness may be said to be a qualitative consideration; the quan-
titative aspect of acts of self-defense is taken care of,by the re-
quirement of proportionality.
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5. The requirement of proportionality
A state may use in self-defense only such measure of force as is
necessary to repel the attack. There is of course no mathematical
formula for measuring the relative magnitude of the forceful
means used by one side or the other and in any case the exact
equivalence of forcible means used on both sides is not what is
meant by the requirement of proportionality. As a general rule it
may be said that only such disproportion as denotes a manifest in-
tention to inflict injury beyond what is required to repulse the at-
tack would result in a failure to meet the requirement of propor-
tionality. Each case will have to be judged on its own merits after
all the facts have been ascertained and evaluated in the light of
the particular circumstances of the case. There are, however,
cases where there would doubtless be failure to observe the rule
of proportionality, such as a massive invasion of the territory of a
state in response to a relatively minor border incident. Also, a
nuclear strike in alleged self-defense against an attack by conven-
tional weapons would fail to meet the requirement of propor-
tionality. Generally speaking, the means used in self-defense must
correspond to its sole purpose-warding off the actual attack and
preventing it from attaining its objectives. Again, it may be said
that the target of self-defense is the attack as such, and not the
state responsible for the attack.
6. Consequences of failure to meet the above requirements
In a case of state responsibility where the action taken in self-
defense fails to meet the requirement of the priority of an armed
attack or that of the immediacy of the response, a plea of self-
defense by the respondent state will fail and the said state will re-
main responsible for all the loss and damage resulting from its
unlawful use of force. Where the response fails altogether to meet
the requirement of effectiveness, the plea of self-defense will also
fail. In the assessment of damages, however, the claimant state's
responsibility for the initial attack will be taken into account, thus
neutralizing the respondent state's responsibility in the measure
of the claimant State's own responsibility for the initial attack.
When the response fails only partially to meet the requirement of
effectiveness, and when it fails to meet the requirement of propor-
tionality, the respondent state invoking self-defense will remain
responsible for the qualitative or quantitative excess of force used
by it in self-defense. In this case too, the claimant state's respon-
sibility for the initial attack will be taken into consideration in
19801
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
assessing the damages, with the result that in certain instances
the respondent state's notional responsibility for the use of inef-
fective or disproportionate force may not entail any practical
results in terms of compensation for the claimant state, although
it may reduce the liability resulting for it from its own unlawful
use of force in the initial attack.
V. CONCLUSION
Self-defense is only one of several defenses available to pre-
clude state responsibility. It is a defense of restricted applicability
in today's world, and under the U.N. Charter may only be invoked
in those situations where a prior illegal use of force has been
asserted against the state alleging self-defense as an exculpatory
factor. The absolute prohibition of the use of force thus remains a
provision of international law, binding on the whole community of
nations.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter exclusively delineates the scope
and content of the right of self-defense, making it an exculpation
of state responsibility only when used in response to a prior armed
attack. Armed attack in the definitional framework does include a
variety of military actions threatening the sovereign integrity
of states, but does not include institutional methods of coercion
commonly used by states in carrying out their functions and en-
forcing their laws.
The doctrinal belief that "armed attack" can be distinguished
from "armed aggression" is a faulty one, overlooking the impor-
tant role that the concept of proportionality plays in determining
what an appropriate response to various incidents having dif-
ferent degrees of seriousness should be. But neither the propor-
tionality concept nor other meta-juridical arguments based on
strategic considerations can justify the use of anticipatory self-
defense. Modern electronic surveilance and reconnaissance per-
mits quick, effective response to planned aggressions, and the ef-
fective use of international world opinion, not to mention second
strike capability where nuclear force is involved, should be suffi-
cient to dispense with the need for "anticipatory" self-defense
actions.
Ultimately, any exculpatory self-defense actions must meet the
requirements of immediacy, effectiveness and proportionality to
receive international imprimatur. The continuity of a viable world
order vitally depends on the limitation and circumscription of the
use of self-defense as an exculpatory factor in state responsibility.
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